Abstract: This paper examines the impact of a teacher contract reform in Chile that tied salary bonuses to performance on teacher skills acquisition tests. The reform was first implemented in public schools, while private and subsidized private schools were not affected. Using administrative data covering the universe of teachers, I study the effects of the policy in a difference-in-differences framework and find that it significantly increased teacher retention. To interpret potential effects on productivity, I draw on a multitasking framework with dynamic complementarities between classroom instruction and skill acquisition. The model emphasizes that productivity gains depend on how the incentivized skills interact over time with core teaching tasks. Consistent with this mechanism—and supported by empirical evidence on differential complementarities—I find that the reform increased the productivity of math teachers, as measured by teacher value added in student test scores, but had no effect on reading teachers.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of a recruitment policy aimed at improving the quality of new teachers. The reform introduced a scholarship to incentivize the enrollment of high-achieving high school graduates in teacher training programs and imposed enrollment restrictions on low-achieving high school graduates. The screening device used to define achievement was the national standardized university entry exam. Using rich administrative data, we document that the reform was effective in improving the average test scores of new teachers. We construct teacher value-added (TVA) measures based on standardized test scores of their pupils and find that the reform led to a 30\% standard deviation increase in the TVA of mathematics teachers. However, it did not affect the average TVA of Spanish teachers. We show that this heterogeneity can be explained by differences in the correlation of test scores and TVA across subjects. Finally, we show that only 20\% of the increase in TVA can be explained by the selection based on the screening device, and the remainder can be attributed to beneficial but unintended effects of the reform. Using survey data, we show that a large share of this remaining effect is driven by the screening out of those low-achieving graduates who were less intrinsically motivated. 

Abstract: We investigate whether the decision of young adults on when to leave the parental home is influenced by the number of siblings they have, in the context of European countries over the last seventy years. Using data from two large surveys and exploiting random variation in sibship size induced by twin births, we identify the causal effect of having an extra sibling on the timing of home-leaving. We find that one additional sibling speeds up the transition to independent living by roughly six months. We provide evidence that our results directly stem from a decrease in the value of intergenerational coresidence implied by having an extra sibling. 

Abstract: Using administrative data from Chile, we analyze whether financing higher education through student loans or grants affects the college major choices of prospective university students. We exploit institutional arrangements that allocate either type of financing based on a standardized test to locally identify exogenous variation in access. Students who are marginally eligible for grants are more likely to enroll in high-paying fields such as STEM. We complement this reduced-form result with a discrete choice model that we estimate on data for narrowly defined higher education programs drawn from past graduates. The results indicate that, holding other program characteristics constant, grant recipients place higher value on fields with high earnings growth potential, while being less concerned about a lower graduation probability